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Right to Travel

* US Const. Amend 5

* US Transportation Code , Title 7 ( Vehicles & Traffic ), Subtitle A ( Certificates of Title & Registration of Vehicles ), Chapter 502 ( Registration of Vehicles ), Subchapter A ( General Provisions )
Sec. 502.003. Registration by Political Subdivision Prohibited.
(a) Except as provided by Subsection (b), a political subdivision of this state may not require an owner of a motor vehicle to:
(1) register the vehicle;
(2) pay a motor vehicle registration fee; or
(3) pay an occupation tax or license fee in connection with a motor vehicle.
(b) This section does not affet the authority of a municipality to:
(1) License and regulate the use of motor vehicles for compensation within the municipal limits; and
(2) impose a permit fee or street rental charge for the operation of each motor vehicle used to transport passengers for compensation, other than a motor vehicle operating under a registration certificate from the department or a permit from the federal Surface Transportation Board...

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Kent v Dulles, 357 US 116 (1958); 78 SCt 1113; 2 L.Ed. 2d 1204 (1958)
"Held:... (a) The right to travel is a part of the 'liberty' of which a citizen cannot be deprived without due process of law under the Fifth Amendment."

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Boyd v US, 116 US 616, 635 (1886)
"Summary -- Holding that a notice to produce personal papers was "unconstitutional and void, and that the inspection by the district attorney of said invoice, when produced in obedience to said notice, and its admission in evidence by the court, were erroneous and unconstitutional proceedings."
"Held, To be unconstitutional and void as applied to suits for penalties, or to establish a forfeiture of the party's goods, as being repugnant to the Fourth and Fifth Amendments of the Constitution.
"It does not require actual entry upon premises and search for and seizure of papers to constitute an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment; a compulsory production of a party's private books and papers to be used against himself or his property in a criminal or penal proceeding, or for a forfeiture, is within the spirit and meaning of the Amendment [ Italics added ]. It is equivalent to a compulsory production of papers, to make the non-production of them a confession of the allegations which it is pretended they will prove. A proceeding to forfeit a person's goods for an offense against the laws, though civil in form, and whether in rem or in personam, is a "criminal case" within the meaning of that part of the Fifth Amendment which declares that no person "shall be compelled, in any criminal case, to be a witness against himself." The seizure or compulsory production of a man's private papers to be used in evidence against him is equivalent to compelling him to be a witness against himself, and, in a prosecution for a crime, penalty or forfeiture, is equally within the prohibition of the Fifth Amendment. Both amendments relate to the personal security of the citizen. They nearly run into and mutually throw light upon each other. When the thing forbidden in the Fifth Amendment, namely, compelling a man to be a witness against himself, is the object of a search and seizure of his private papers, it is an "unreasonable search and seizure" within the Fourth Amendment. Search and seizure of a man's private papers to be used in evidence for the purpose of convicting him of a crime, recovering a penalty, or of forfeiting his property, is totally different from the search and seizure of stolen goods, dutiable articles on which the duties have not been paid, and the like, which rightfully belong to the custody of the law. Constitutional provisions for the security of person and property should be liberally construed."
"If a citizen's liberty to travel is to be regulated, it must be pursuant to the law-making functions of Congress, any delegation of the power must be subject to adequate standards, and such delegated authority will be narrowly construed." P. 129.

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 Shapiro v Thompson 394 U.S. P 618
 “All citizens must be free to travel throughout the United States uninhibited by statues, rules, or regulations which unreasonably burden or restrict this movement. If a law has no other purpose than to chill assertions of constitutional rights by penalizing those who choose to exercise them, it is patently unconstitutional.
“The equal protection clause prohibits apportionment of state services according to par tax contributions of its citizens. Any classification which serves to penalize the exercise of the right of interstate travel, unless shown to be necessary to promote a compelling government interest, is unconstitutional...
“The right finds no explicit mention in the constitution. That a right so elementary was conceived from the beginning to be necessary
concomitant to the stronger union the constitution created. In any event freedom to travel throughout the Unites States has long been recognized as a basic right under the constitution.”

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Eggert v. Seattle, 81 Wn. 2d. 840 (1973); 505 P.2d. 801 (1973)
"Constitutional law -- Equal Protection -- Impairment -- Considerations -- "In determining whether a statutory classification violates constitutional equal protection rights, the courts must examine the governmental interests asserted in support of the classification, its character, and the individual interests affected by it."
"Equal Protection -- Impairment -- Fundamental Right -- Burden of Proof -- " A showing of compelling state interest must be made to justify a classification affecting a fundamental right involving a protected individual interest."
"Constitutional Law -- Right to Travel -- Nature -- Scope -- The federal constitution guarantees an unconditional, personal 'right to travel' which protects both interstate and intrastate migration or movement with the intent to settle and abide. A compelling state interest must be shown to justify any burden placed upon the right or penalty imposed on the exercise." [ See 16 Am.Jur.2d., Constitutional Law, Sect. 359 ]

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Thompson v Smith, 154 SE 579
Summary : "In Thompson v. Smith, 155 Va. 367, 154 S.E. 579, 581, 584, 71 A.L.R. 604, the court discussed the rights of a police chief to revoke drivers' licenses under a provision of the city ordinances which stated: "The Chief of Police is authorized and directed to revoke [subject to right of appeal] the permit of any driver who, in his opinion, becomes unfit to drive an automobile on the streets of the city.
"If the provision of an ordinance authorizing the chief of police to revoke a driver's permit, when he deems the driver unfit to drive, is void, because it is a delegation of legislative power to an administrative office and vests the chief of police with an arbitrary discretion, the provision of the same ordinance authorizing the exercise of the same discretion by the judge of the municipal court upon an application for reinstatement of the permit is also void; and the provision of the ordinance that the person whose permit has been revoked by the chief of police may apply to the judge of the municipal court for reinstatement cannot constitute an adequate remedy at law...
"5. STREETS AND HIGHWAYS — Right of Citizen to Travel and Transport Property — Use of Ordinary Vehicles. — The right of a citizen to travel upon the public highways and to transport his property thereon in the ordinary course of life and business is a common right which he has under his right to enjoy life and liberty, to acquire and possess property, and to pursue happiness and safety. It includes the right in so doing to use the ordinary and usual conveyances of the day. This right is not a mere privilege which a city may permit or prohibit at will. 
"6. STREETS AND HIGHWAYS — Right of Citizen to Travel and Transport Property — Use of Ordinary Vehicles — Police Power. — The right of a citizen to travel and transport property and to use the ordinary and usual conveyances of the day may, under the police power, be regulated by the city in the interest of public safety and welfare; but the city may not arbitrarily or unreasonably prohibit or restrict it, nor may it permit one to exercise it and refuse to permit another of like qualifications, under like conditions and circumstances, to exercise it..
"7. AUTOMOBILES — Drivers' Permits — Arbitrary Revocation. — The regulation of the exercise of the right to drive a private automobile on the streets of the city may be accomplished in part by the city by granting, refusing, and revoking under rules of general application permits to drive an automobile on its streets; but such permits may not be arbitrarily refused or revoked, or permitted to be held by some and refused to others of like qualifications, under like circumstances and conditions.
"8. AUTOMOBILES — Exercise of Right to Drive — Granting and Revoking Permits — Arbitrary Discretion. — The doctrine that when the State or city has the power to prohibit the doing of an act altogether, it has the power to permit the doing of the act under any condition, or subject to any regulation, however arbitrary, has no application to a permit issued for the purpose of regulating the exercise of the common right to operate a private automobile on the streets of a city.
"9. PUBLIC OFFICERS — Powers of Administrative Officers — Legislation by Administrative Officers. — It is a fundamental principle of our system of government that the rights of men are to be determined by the law itself, and not by the let or leave of administrative officers or bureaus. It is the prerogative of the legislative branch of the government to determine and declare what the law shall be, and the legislative branch may not delegate this function to executive or administrative officers.
"This does not mean, however, that no discretion can be left to administrative officers in administering the law. Government could not be efficiently carried on if something could not be left to the judgment and discretion of administrative officers to accomplish in detail what is authorized or required by law in general terms. Without this power legislation would become either oppressive or inefficient. There would be confusion in the laws, and in an effort to detail and particularize, the law would miss sufficiency both in provision and detail. Block v. Chicago, 239 Ill. 251, 87 N. E. 1011, 130 Am. St. R. 219; Mutual Film Corp. v. Ohio Indus. Comm., 236 U. S. 239, 35 Sup. Ct. 387, 59 L. Ed. 552, Ann. Cas. 1916-C, 296. This is particularly true where the discretion to be exercised by administrative officers relates to police regulations designed to protect the public morals, health, safety and general welfare. As said by Burks, J., in Taylor v. Smith, supra: "A city may, in the exercise of its police power, invest its administrative and executive officers with a reasonable discretion in the performance of duties devolved upon them to that end, whenever it is necessary for the safety and welfare of the public." But, it should be added, the reasonable discretion which may be vested in its administrative officers is limited to a discretion in its essence ministerial and not legislative, though it may be such as may be exercised by the legislature.
"Where a statute or ordinance assumes to regulate the exercise of a common right, such as that here involved, by requiring a permit for the exercise thereof, which is to be granted or refused and may be revoked by an administrative officer in his discretion, the correct principles for determining whether it is void because it delegates legislative power to the administrative officer are stated by the court in Mutual Film Corp. v. Ohio Industrial Commission, 236 U. S. 239, 35 Sup. Ct. 387, 392, 59 L. Ed. 552, Ann. Cas. 1916-C, 296, in the following language: "The legislature must declare the policy of the law and fix the legal principles which are to control in given cases; but an administrative body may be invested with the power to ascertain the facts and conditions to which the policy and principles apply."
"Mere matters of detail within the policy, and the legal principles and standards established by the statute or ordinance, may properly be left to administrative discretion, for the determination of such matters of detail is more essentially ministerial than legislative. In declaring the policy of the law and fixing the legal principles and standards which are to control in the administration of the law, general terms, which get precision from the technical knowledge or sense and experience of men and thereby become reasonably certain, may be used; and an administrative officer or bureau may be invested with the power to ascertain and determine whether the qualifications, facts or conditions comprehended in and required by such general terms exist, and whether the provisions of the law so fixed and declared have been complied with in accordance with the generally accepted meaning of the words. [ Mutual Film Corp. v. Ohio Industrial Commission, supra; Yee Bow v. Cleveland, 99 Ohio St. 269, 124 N. E. 132, 12 A. L. R. 1424; Block v. Chicago, 239 Ill. 251, 87 N. E. 1011, 130 Am. St. Rep. 219.]
"10. Public Officers — Powers of Administrative Officers — Discretion of Administrative Officers. — The principle that the rights of men are to be determined by the law itself and not by administrative officers does not mean, however, that no discretion can be left to administrative officers in administering the law. Government could not be efficiently carried on if something could not be left to the judgment and discretion of administrative officers to accomplish in detail what is authorized or required by law in general terms. This is particularly true where the discretion to be exercised relates to police regulations. But the reasonable discretion which may be vested in city administrative officers is limited to a discretion in its essence ministerial and not legislative, though it may be such as may be exercised by the legislature..". [ Italics added ]
"17. STREETS AND HIGHWAYS — Right to Use the Public Highways — Whether Property Right. — Whether a right to use the public highways for the ordinary and usual purposes of life be a property right or not, it is a very valuable right, not a mere privilege.
"18. Unconstitutionality of a Statute or Ordinance. — The invalidity or unconstitutionality of a statute or ordinance is not of itself a ground of equity jurisdiction. A court of equity has not jurisdiction to enjoin acts only because they are attempted or threatened under color of an unconstitutional or void statute or ordinance. Further circumstances must be shown which bring the case within some recognized ground of equity jurisdiction; but inadequacy of legal remedy or irreparable injury are well recognized grounds of equity jurisdiction.
"19. INJUNCTIONS — Jurisdiction — Invalid Statute or Ordinance — Property Rights Threatened — Adequate Remedy at Law. — It is recognized that an injunction will lie to enjoin the threatened enforcement of an invalid statute or ordinance where the lawful use and enjoyment of private property will be injuriously affected by its enforcement, or where the right of a person to conduct a lawful business will be injuriously affected thereby, unless the remedy at law be manifestly as complete and adequate as an injunction suit.
"20. INJUNCTIONS — Jurisdiction — Enforcement of Personal Rights — Right to Travel on Highway. — It has been said that it is beyond the scope of the powers of a court of equity to enforce personal rights as distinguished from property rights, but this distinction is not well made. Fundamental personal rights, such as the right of a person to travel the public highways of the State, are not less sacred and valuable rights, or less subject to the protection of a court of equity, in a proper case, than are property rights.
"21. INJUNCTIONS — Jurisdiction — Enforcement of Right to Travel on Highway — Irreparable Injury. — An injunction suit is often a more appropriate and effective method of resisting the invasion of or interference with a personal right, such as the right to travel on the public highways, under color of void statute or ordinance than any common law remedy; and where the remedy at law is not as complete and as fully adequate as an injunction suit, or where the threatened or attempted enforcement of a void statute or ordinance will do irreparable injury to a person in interfering with the exercise of such a common fundamental personal right, a suit for injunction will lie.
"22. INJUNCTIONS — Irreparable Injury — Definition. — By irreparable injury is meant an injury of such a nature that fair and reasonable redress may not be had in a court of law and to refuse the injunction would be a denial of justice.
"23. AUTOMOBILES — Revocation of Driver's Permit — Injunction — Case at Bar. — The real object of the instant suit was to obtain for the applicant freedom from the restraint imposed by a void ordinance upon his exercise of the common right to drive his automobile on the streets of a city. Complainant might have proceeded by petition for mandamus to compel the chief of police to restore his driving permit, or have waited until arrested upon the charge of driving without a permit and then interposed the defense that the provisions of the ordinance under which his permit had been taken from him were void. Neither of these remedies is as complete and adequate as a suit for injunction to protect complainant against wrongful interference, under color of a void ordinance, with his right to drive an automobile.

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Taylor v. Smith, 140 Va. 217, 124 S. E. 259, 263; Ex parte Dickey, 76 W. Va. 576, 85 S. E. 781, L. R. A. 1915-F, 840
"The exercise of such a common right the city may, under its police power, regulate in the interest of the public safety and welfare; but it may not arbitrarily or unreasonably prohibit or restrict it, nor may it permit one to exercise it and refuse to permit another of like qualifications, under like conditions and circumstances, to exercise it...
"It has been said that when the State or a city has the power to prohibit the doing of an act altogether, it has the power to permit the doing of the act upon any condition, or subject to any regulation, however arbitrary or capricious it may be; and may lawfully delegate to executive or administrative officers an uncontrolled and arbitrary discretion as to granting and revoking permits or licenses to do such act."

Owen v. City Of Independence , 445 U.S. 622, 635 (1980)
"Held: A municipality has no immunity from liability under 43 USC Section 1983 flowing from its constitutional violations and may not assert the good faith of its officers as a defense to such liability."

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